A Critical Analysis of Sanitary Risk and Global Economic Implications
Ricardo Santin, president of Brazilian Association of Animal Protein (ABPA) and president of International Poultry Council (IPC)
The H5N1 virus of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is a relevant pathogen, posing risks mainly to animal health and with significant impacts on food security and international trade. Despite its persistence in raw poultry products, this article critically analyzes the possibility of virus transmission to local industrial poultry production through imported meat inspected by a recognized veterinary service. Based on evidence from intergovernmental organizations (WOAH/OIE, FAO, WHO, CDC, FDA), the conclusion is that the risk is virtually null. Thus, the revision of trade policies based on an outdated precautionary principle is advocated, proposing a new balanced approach that preserves both animal health and access to essential poultry proteins for vulnerable populations.
1. Introduction
Avian influenza caused by the H5N1 subtype has drawn increasing attention since its emergence in the 2000s, due to its lethality in birds, occasional zoonotic capacity, and impact on the global trade of poultry products. Although the primary route of transmission occurs among live birds through direct or indirect contact with respiratory secretions or feces, fears of contamination from poultry products led to the imposition of often disproportionate trade barriers, even in production chains under strict sanitary control.
2. Resistance of H5N1 to Freezing
Laboratory studies have demonstrated that H5N1 can remain viable in raw frozen meat for more than 60 days at –18 °C or below. However, viral viability does not imply an effective risk of infection, particularly when the product:
- undergoes ante mortem and post mortem veterinary inspection;
- is processed in controlled industrial environments;
- is intended for human consumption and therefore cooked at ≥74 °C — a condition sufficient to inactivate the virus before consumption ([CDC, 2024]; [FDA, 2024]; [FAO/WOAH, 2023]).
3. Risk Analysis for Local Industrial Production
In scenarios where importing countries:
- use exclusively thermally treated industrial feed (pelleted or extruded);
- maintain isolated farms, with guaranteed biosecurity;
- prohibit the use of raw by-products in animal feed;
- ensure controlled disposal of waste;
- conduct routine sanitary inspections;
… the risk of H5N1 introduction into live animals from imported meat is, according to epidemiological criteria, close to zero. The WOAH considers the trade of poultry meat slaughtered under inspection as safe, even from countries with HPAI outbreaks, provided that products do not originate from the outbreak itself. Therefore, the consideration of zoning proposed by that same organization must be urgently evaluated by countries that have not yet adopted it in their trade relations.
4. The Precautionary Principle: When It Becomes a Trade Barrier
The blind application of the precautionary principle — particularly in products that have undergone sanitary inspection and are intended for human consumption — may result in unnecessary trade measures with impacts disproportionate to the actual threat. Closing markets to poultry meat imports under such circumstances:
- does not significantly reduce sanitary risk;
- economically penalizes exporting countries;
- generates food inflation in importing countries;
- especially affects low-income populations, limiting access to high biological value proteins rich in essential amino acids.
5. The Paradox of Migratory Birds
While the importation of inspected poultry meat is banned under strict precautionary measures, migratory birds continue to move freely across borders, often serving as asymptomatic vectors of highly pathogenic avian influenza. Ignoring this natural source of spread while overestimating the risk from industrialized food products exposes an incoherence in international sanitary policies, which must be urgently revised in light of technical and economic evidence.
6. Conclusion
Under controlled production, slaughter, and processing conditions for human consumption, poultry products do not pose a sanitary risk to industrial flocks in other countries, provided they are not redirected to animal feed or supplied to live birds. The risk of HPAI virus transmission through this route is practically negligible, technically null.
In this sense, trade restrictions based on an exaggerated precautionary principle lack technical and practical foundation. Moreover, they hinder the global supply of poultry products, market balance, and the nutritional well-being of vulnerable populations. A regulatory paradigm shift is proposed, based on real risk, science, and proportionality, acknowledging the need to coexist in a world where zoonoses circulate naturally — including through uncontrollable means, such as wild bird migration. After all, what greater risk do poultry products represent that is not already present in wild or migratory birds?
References (examples to be expanded):
- World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH/OIE). Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2023.
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2023. Avian Influenza Risk Management for Trade.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Food Safety, 2024.
- World Health Organization (WHO). Avian Influenza: Assessing the pandemic risk, 2024.
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Avian Influenza and Food Products, 2024.
- PAHO/WHO. Avian Influenza Technical Bulletin, 2023.